Intergubernamentalismo y Federalismo: Dos aproximaciones teóricas a la integración europea

SUMMARY INTRODUCTION II. AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK l. The realistic antecedent: Morgenthau 2. Intergovernmentalism: Hoffmann 3. Liberal intergovernmentalism: Moravcsik A) Intergovernmental Institutionalism B) Liberal intergovernmentalism C) «The Choice for Europe» III. THE FEDERAL HORIZON l. Federalism 2. Neofederalism: some recent developments A) Spirit, method and federal institutions: Sidjanski B) From the political principle and process to the normative structure: Mazan C) Federalism not state, but supranational: Bogdand

The New Intergovernmentalism and the Euro Crisis: A Painful Case? LEQS Paper No. 145/2019 June 2019

The new intergovernmentalism seeks to understand the changing dynamics of contemporary European integration. It emphasises, inter alia, member states’ preference for deliberative modes of decision-making and their reluctance to delegate new powers to traditional supranational institutions. The euro crisis is sometimes seen as a difficult case for the new intergovernmentalism because of the perceived importance of hard bargaining over crisis measures during this episode and the new roles entrusted to the European Commission and the European Central Bank under crisis reforms. Such criticisms, this paper argues, overlook: the importance of high-level consensus-seeking and deliberation in saving the single currency; the disparate forms of delegation deployed to preserve member state influence over Economic and Monetary Union; and the extent to which the euro crisis has amplified the European Union’s political disequilibrium. Far from running counter to the new intergovernmentalism, it concludes, the euro crisis exemplifies the turbulent dynamics of the post-Maastricht period

Preferences, preference formation and position taking in a Eurozone out: Lessons from the United Kingdom

In the literature on member state position-taking in the eurozone crisis, the debate has mainly centred on whether national preferences are shaped exclusively within the domestic setting or influenced by shared EU-level norms or interaction within EU institutions. This article goes beyond this discussion. Drawing on original data collected by the authors, it uses the UK’s experience to test the claims both of society-centred approaches, including liberal intergovernmentalism, and perspectives that emphasise the importance of shared EU norms or interaction. It argues that while the first overlook the role of institutions as both actors and mediating variables in preference formation, the second have so far focused on the experience of eurozone members, thereby raising the possibility of selection bias. Treating eurozone form as a series of processes rather than a single event, it contests the claim that preference formation is always driven by societal interests, highlights instances where government acts in the absence of or contrary to expressed societal interests, and reveals limitations of the shared norms critique of liberal intergovernmentalism. It shows that the UK government was driven by a scholars concern to protect the UK economy from financial contagion rather than solidarity with its European partners

The end of social Europe? Understanding EU social policy change

The financial and economic crisis has increased attention on EU social policy, yet little policy change has been realized. Drawing on Easton’s political system approach, we differentiate demand emanating from the difficult situation following the crisis and support in form of the 2004, 2009 and 2014 European elections. On the output side, we show how social policy has been substantially removed from the priorities of the EU political agenda already prior to the crisis. We argue that it is the contrast between crisis-generated demand and a more long-term lack of policy support that empowered actors interested in deepening economic integration and austerity policies. We present new empirical data that shows how partisan and governmental preferences are channelled through the EU institutions and how thus, changing ideological composition of the Commission as agenda-setter and an asymmetrical intergovenmentalist turn, have been a key driver for the substantial decline of EU social policy provision

Neofunctionalism revisited : integration theory and varieties of outcomes in the Eurocrisis

The Euro crisis has produced a plethora of new institutions, policies, and projects to reform the Euro Area. This paper offers a theoretical and empirical contribution in the study of the New Economic Governance. By building on insights from classical Neofunctionalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism, the paper revisits the static component of Philippe Schmitter's 'Neo-Neofunctionalist' framework. Static Neo-Neofunctionalism is then applied as a means to provide a systemic interpretation of crisis-led integration in the Euro crisis. The large majority of episodes of crisis-led integration in the 2011-2016 years is included in the analysis. In assessing Neo-Neofunctionalist expectations on the New Economic Governance, the paper matches analysis of legal documents with the results of a dedicated Expert Survey on the EMU governance fielded in October 2018

Interlinking neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism: Sidelining governments and manipulating policy preferences as "passerelles"

The EU's founding fathers had the protection of the EU's constituent units as a key concern and set up serious hurdles to policy innovation in the absence of unanimous governmental agreement. These institutional design features, aptly characterised as "joint-decision trap" by Fritz W. Scharpf, were only softened but not erased over time. Nonetheless, the problem of how to innovate has, at times, been overcome through eclectic means. There are indeed some well known and quite visible practices as well as some less expected and more obscure strategies that have propelled the EU's policy system beyond what has for a long time been expected. This paper argues that there are two strategic moves the European Commission (and, at times, other supranational actors such as the European Court of Justice) can use to actively overcome member state opposition: first, sidelining some or even all national governments; and, second, manipulating relevant policy preferences. These two basic strategies can be seen to interconnect the diverging basic assumptions of intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism as 'passerelles'.political science; joint decision making; unanimity; integration theory; intergovernmentalism; neo-functionalism

Knocking on the EU's door: the political economy of EU-Ukraine relations

The EU has recently launched the European Neighbourhood Policy, aimed at fostering integration with countries located close to its borders. This article proposes a liberal intergovernmentalist framework for the analysis of Ukraine's prospects of integration with the EU and apply it to evaluate the main economic and political benefits and costs associated to three possible scenarios: free trade area, fully developed European Neighbourhood Policy and EU accession. Two main conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, gains from integration would be asymmetrically distributed and would mostly accrue to Ukraine, whilst the main obstacles to integration would not be economic, but political. Secondly, the European Neighbourhood Policy does not represent a credible long-term alternative to EU membership for Ukraine; thus the outcome of the integration process should probably consist either in the mere creation of a free trade area or in EU accession.Economic integration; European Union; European Neighbourhood Policy; Ukraine

Spanish leadership in developing a \u27common\u27 European immigration policy: Intergovernmentalist supranationalization approach

I EXAMINE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMON EUROPEAN IMMIGRATION POLICY (SINCE THE 1980S) WITHIN THE LINES OF TWO MAJOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THEORIES: INTERGOVERNMENTALISM AND SUPRANATIONALISM. APPLICATION OF ANDREW MORAVCSIK\u27S LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALIST APPROACH TO THE CASE STUDY OF THE SPANISH IMMIGRATION LAW EVOLUTION (SINCE 1980S) REVEALS THAT SPAIN, AS A NATION STATE, CONTINUES TO EXERT DOMESTIC PREFERENCES ON THE EU LEVEL, WITH RESPECT TO THE COMMON POLICY REGIME. THEREFORE, DESPITE THE GRADUAL POLICY-MAKING AND DECISION-MAKING EMPOWERNMENT OF THE EU INSTITUTIONS, I CONCLUDE THAT INTERGOVERNMENTALISM PREVAILS IN THE IMMIGRATION POLICY RHETORIC

The EU in the G8 system: assessing EU member states' involvement

Even though the role of the European Union (EU) in international organizations has generated increasing academic and political interest, scant attention has been devoted to the EU’s participation in the Group of Eight (G8). The launch of the renewed Group of Twenty (G20), however, has sparked intense debate among member states about the way in which the EU is represented in the G8 system. The central issue covered in this paper is the participation of the EU in the G8 system. In particular, we focus on the involvement of the 23 non-G8 EU members (EU23) and the role of the European Commission and the Council Presidency. The focus lies on the internal EU level, rather than on the question of the EU’s bargaining power at the international level. The paper draws on insights of Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism to explain the variation of the EU23’s involvement in the following policy domains: development aid, energy, finance and monetary affairs and trade. The paper finds a pattern of differing involvement that varies along the lines of the three forums within the G8 system: low involvement in the G8, medium involvement in the G20 and high involvement in the Group of Seven (G7). Four factors are suggested that explain the involvement of the EU23 in the internal EU coordination process: internal competences, intra-EU consensus, policy implications and the role of EU actors